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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Priority No. 2
v.
RAYMOND DEHERRERA,
Case No. 960300-CA
Defendant/Appellant.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING AND JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals his conviction for burglary, a second-degree felony, claiming
that his trial counsel was ineffective. This Court has jurisdiction of second-degree
felony appeals under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1996).
ISSUES AND REVIEW STANDARDS
1.

Has defendant shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial

would have been more favorable had counsel called an expert witness to show that
defendant was not in the house when shot? Because this case is on review from a rule
23B hearing, this Court defers to the trial court's findings of fact. State v. Huggins,
920 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Utah App. 1996). This Court, however, makes the final legal
conclusion about ineffectiveness de novo. Id.
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2.

When defendant gives one paragraph to his claim that trial counsel's

eyesight hindered his defense and that paragraph includes no legal analysis or citation,
has he waived his right to appellate review by failing to adequately brief the issue?
This matter was not before the trial court.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or
theft or commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
A jury convicted defendant of burglary, a second-degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1996) (R. 82). Thereafter, the trial court sentenced
defendant to the statutory indeterminate prison term of l-to-15 years (R. 87). After
filing a timely notice of appeal, defendant requested a remand under rule 23B, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, to obtain facts regarding trial counsel's effectiveness and
whether trial counsel's eyesight hindered his ability to provide a constitutionally
adequate defense (R. 332). The trial court held the remand hearing on March 24, 1997
and subsequently issued Findings of Fact (R. 341-342; 346-350).
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Statement of Facts
THE BURGLARY
Awakened from her sleep at 7:00 a.m. by persistent ringing of the doorbell,
Jocelyn Struhs asked her 71-year old husband, Kenneth, to go downstairs and see what
was wrong (R. 211). Walking with a crutch because of recent arthroscopic surgery on
his knee, Mr. Struhs got to the head of the stairs when the doorbell stopped and he
began hearing a loud banging on the back door (id.). Because of the violent nature of
the banging, he thought someone was trying to break in so he went to get his .22
semiautomatic rifle (R. 213). About the same time that he picked up the rifle, he heard
the two-inch thick, solid oak door crash down (id.). He walked into the kitchen and
saw defendant and another man come in through the door toward him (R. 214). Mr.
Struhs yelled to his wife to call 911, which she did (R. 244). As she was talking to
dispatch, she looked into the kitchen and saw defendant coming toward her husband (R.
244-45).
Defendant was approaching Mr. Struhs, though possibly in a slightly sideways
direction, "very rapidly, faster than a fast walk" with his hands out in front of him "in a
grasping mode" (R. 215; 238). Though defendant saw Mr. Struhs' rifle and said
"[d]on't shoot," he kept coming anyway (id.). Despite his fear, Mr. Struhs "just
couldn't pull the trigger in [defendant's] face," so he lowered the gun and fired at
defendant's leg (R. 216). Defendant then turned around, said "you shot me" and tried
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to start out the door (R. 217). Even though Mr. Struhs told him to stop and get down
on the floor, defendant did not do so until he got out onto the patio (id.).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Defendant claimed that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance because he failed to hire an expert witness to testify that
he was not in the house when shot. At the rule 23B hearing, the expert witness hired
specifically for the hearing was unable to say that defendant could never have been
inside the house. Because the expert's testimony did not contradict the victims'
testimony that defendant was in the house, the jury would have had no reason to
disregard the victims' testimony. Consequently, an expert, even if he had testified at
trial, would have presented no information of such significance to make it reasonably
probable that a different result would have happened.
Failure to present suficient argument. Defendant's Point Two does not
comply with rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. It does not include any legal
citation nor does it relate the evidence from the trial or the remand hearing to the
operative law. Therefore, it should not be reviewed on appeal.
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ARGUMENT
L

TRIAL COUNSEL'S CHOICE NOT TO HIRE AN
EXPERT WAS A LEGITIMATE TRIAL STRATEGY
AND THE EXPERT TESTIMONY PRESENTED AT
THE RULE 23B HEARING SHOWED THAT AN
EXPERT WOULD NOT HAVE MADE A MORE
FAVORABLE VERDICT LIKELY.

Defendant claims trial counsel gave him constitutionally inadequate
representation because he did not hire an expert witness to show that defendant was not
in the house when shot. To permit defendant an opportunity to bolster this claim, this
Court remanded for a hearing via which the trial court could hear evidence about trial
counsel's preparation and execution of the case.
To establish that trial counsel provided ineffective representation, defendant must
show (1) trial counsel's performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard
of reasonableness; and (2) but for this deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that
the result of the proceeding would have been different.1 Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 694 (1984) ; see also State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995).
Essential to a correct application of Strickland is recognizing the effect of the
Court's "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of

Strickland added a sub-definition to this definition when it stated that a "reasonable
probability" is a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome/ Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 694 (1984). In a shorthand version, the second standard is also referred to as the "prejudice" prong.
State's counsel chooses not to use this shorthand because the definitional statement better expresses the
defendant's heavy burden.
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reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. This presumption is
probably at its strongest when a defendant retrospectively attacks counsel's choice of
trial strategy. Id.; State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993) ("[I]f the
challenged act or omission might be considered sound trial strategy, we will not find
that it demonstrates inadequacy of counsel."); State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465-66
(Utah App. 1993) ("[T]his court will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate
strategic choices, however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect.").
The trial court's findings show that counsel's not using an expert witness was a
conscious, legitimate strategy.
After discussing the case with his client, an expert in
firearms, and other attorneys, and reviewing all the
evidence, Mr. Gordon decided that retaining an expert for
the trial was not necessary because the defendant's case
could be made in other ways, such as by cross-examination.
He decided that an expert was not of ultimate importance.
(R. 348). Though defendant asserts that the findings are wrong, he does not marshal
the evidence necessary to support that assertion. When a party fails to challenge a
factual finding and marshal the evidence in support of that finding, this Court "assumes
that the record supports the findings of the trial court." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d
198, 199 (Utah 1991) (per curiam) (citing Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v.
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070
(Utah 1985)).
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Nevertheless, even assuming that trial counsel should have hired an expert and
had him testify, the evidence adduced from the rule 23B hearing further shows that the
testimony would have had no probable influence on the trial.
In any event, Mr. Johnston [the expert witness] could
not say that, based on his test results, defendant could not
have been in the house. At most, Mr. Johnston's testimony
would change the victim, Mr. Struh's, location in the house.
Therefore, even if the expert's testimony was correct, it is
not inconsistent with either Mr. or Mrs. Struh's testimony
that defendant was in the house when shot. Further, it does
not undercut the essential element of burglary, i.e., that
defendant illegally entered into or remained unlawfully in
the Struhs' home.
(R. 349; attached as addendum).
Defendant was charged with burglary, i.e., entering a dwelling with the intent to
commit a felony, theft, or assault. To commit this crime, it is not necessary that a
person stay in a dwelling for a certain period of time. It is sufficient merely that he has
entered a house for any period of time. See State v. Peterson, 881 P.2d 965, 968-970
(Utah App. 1994).2 Thus, even with the expert's opinion, i.e., that Mr. Struhs' was
not in the position he claimed to be in when he shot defendant, the jury had sufficient
evidence for its verdict. The expert's testimony was not of such significance that it
Interestingly, defendant's approach in this case is surprisingly similar to the attempt in
Peterson to show, via expert witness, that Peterson's accomplice could not have entered the home.
Peterson's argument was that "the police report, the location of J.J.'s body, the testimony of one
expert who testified as to where one should expect to find blood if J.J. was shot in the house ...
combine to raise enough doubt as to the element of entry." Peterson, 881 P.2d at 969. This Court
disagreed and ruled that there was sufficient evidence of an entry, based on the victim's testimony, so
as not to warrant a lesser-included offense. Id.
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created a "probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Consequently, it does not meet the deficiency prong in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 694 (1984); see also State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995).
II.

DEFENDANT PROVIDES NO LEGAL ANALYSIS OR
ARGUMENT FOR HIS CLAIM THAT TRIAL
COUNSEL'S EYESIGHT HINDERED
REPRESENTATION; THEREFORE, THIS COURT
SHOULD REFUSE TO REVIEW IT.

Defendant gives one paragraph to his contention that trial counsel's poor
eyesight prevented him from providing a constitutionally adequate defense.3 This
paragraph does not include any legal citation nor does it discuss any of the evidence
found at the remand hearing. Due to this lack of analysis, the Court should refuse to
review the issue on appeal. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App. 1992);
English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 618-19 (Utah App. 1991) ("the
assertive analysis is not meaningful").

3

In actuality, the trial court in its findings, which defendant does not challenge on
appeal, found that defendant had poor eyesight but was "able to see exhibits, diagrams, and witnesses'
and that the "trial court and the prosecutor allowed Mr. Gordon to view these exhibits in a manner that
facilitated his ability to see them." Again, though he asserts this factual finding is wrong, defendant
nowhere marshals the evidence in support of that proposition. Consequently, this Court can assume the
accuracy of the finding. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) (per curiam). (R. 347).
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CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS J/)_ November 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENEI
[ES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
FINDINGS OF FACT FROM
RULE 23B HEARING

v.
RAYMOND DEHERRERA,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 951901284 FS
Appellate Case No. 960300-CA

After a jury found defendant guilty of burglary, a second-degree felony, he filed
an appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals. During that appeal, defendant requested a
remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, insisting that his trial
counsel, Victor Gordon, provided him ineffective assistance. Defendant specifically
claimed that counsel acted deficiently in two ways: (1) by failing to get an expert
witness to testify about ballistics and trajectory; and (2) representing him while under a
visualiiisability that prevented him from seeing sufficiently to operate in a courtroom.
STfe-appellate court granted the remand request on those two issues and the trial court

'scheduled an evidentiary hearing, which was held on March 24, 1997. Benjamin A.
Hamilton represented defendant; James H. Beadles, assistant attorney general,
represented the State. Defendant, Victor Gordon, and William Johnston, an individual
purporting to be an expert in ballistics, testified. The court makes the following factual
findings.
1.

Victor Gordon met with defendant twelve times to discuss his case and

talked with him twice over the telephone.
2.

Mr. Gordon has practiced criminal law for six years. Before trying

defendant's case, he had represented at least two defendants in burglary cases.
3.

Mr. Gordon is legally blind in his left eye due to a condition called

keritakoma. In October 1995, his right eye was operated on and his cornea was
removed and replaced with an artificial cornea.
4.

When the trial occurred in January 1996, Mr. Gordon had fully recovered

from this operation. However, due to the condition in his left eye, he had to wear
sunglasses to keep out bright lights.
5.

Mr. Gordon was able to see exhibits, diagrams, and witnesses, although

he had to place them within inches of his face to see them.
6.

The trial court and the prosecutor allowed Mr. Gordon to view these

exhibits in a manner that facilitated his ability to see them.
7.

Mr. Gordon twice went to the house where the crime was committed.
2
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8.

In preparing his case, Mr. Gordon spoke with other attorneys and an

expert in firearms about ballistics and trajectory.
9.

Mr. Gordon also saw pictures of the crime scene before the trial.

10.

After discussing the case with his client, an expert in firearms, and other

attorneys, and reviewing all the evidence, Mr. Gordon decided that retaining an expert
for the trial was not necessary because the defendant's case could be made in other
ways, such as by cross-examination. He decided that an expert was not of ultimate
importance.
11.

Defendant did not testify at the trial.

12.

At the rule 23B hearing, defendant testified, but never recounted what

information he provided Mr. Gordon that would have made a reasonably prudent
attorney believe an expert was necessary to provide an adequate defense.
13.

William Johnston testified as an expert for the defendant. At defendant's

request, he made 14 test firings of the gun in an attempt to plot the probable trajectory
of the casing. However, he admitted that he had not read the trial transcript, viewed
the scene of the crime, or interviewed the victim, Kenneth Struhs. Therefore, Mr.
Johnston could not say if the casing had been inadvertently moved between the shooting
and the preparation of the crime scene, whether the condition of the gun had changed
since the incident. Because he had not read the trial transcript, he could not relate his
test firings to the particularities of Mr. Struhs' testimony about his position in the
3
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house. Due to these omissions, the trial court believes Mr. Johnson's testimony and
opinions are not credible.
14.

In any event, Mr. Johnston could not say that, based on his test results,

defendant could not have been in the house. At most, Mr. Johnston's testimony would
change the victim, Mr. Struh's, location in the house. Therefore, even if the expert's
testimony was correct, it is not inconsistent with either Mr. or Mrs. Struh's testimony
that defendant was in the house when shot. Further, it does not undercut the essential
element of burglary, i.e., that defendant illegally entered into or remained unlawfully in
the Struh's home.
14.

The trial court also believes defendant's testimony is self-serving and,

therefore, not credible.

Approved as to Form

Benjamin A. Hamilton
Counsel for Defendant
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